International agreements on transfrontier pollution require approval by domestic political institutions. In this paper we employ a voting game theoretic model to characterize the stability of such agreements when each country's participation is conditioned upon a domestic ratification vote. To describe the pre-treaty or no treaty international situation, we propose a concept of (noncooperative) political equilibrium and prove its existence.
Introduction
International agreements on environmental standards usually require the approval of domestic political institutions. Once an agreement is found at the international level, its prescriptions must be translated into domestic laws through a ratification process. The fact that negotiating countries are in all respects sovereign and independent decision makers, makes ratification a substantial element (possibly a constraint) in the decisional process. The difficulty of attaining the full commitment of many countries in actual cooperation problems (as, for instance, at the Rio and Kyoto conferences on Climate Change) may be partially explained as the effect of such domestic political constraints on the decisions of countries' political leaders.
The stability of an international agreement has been identified in the literature with the properties of various equilibrium concepts in game theoretic models of cooperation. Part of this literature has looked at the possibility of "full" cooperation, i.e., cooperation among all involved countries. Some of these works have studied the core of cooperative games representing the decisional process at the international level (see Chander aler-Tulkens 1995). Core agreements are "stable" solutions to the negotiation problem in that no coalition of countries is able to induce a preferred outcome by its own means. Other contributions have studied the possibility of the formation of smaller coalitions: see, for example, Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) . Both approaches lack an institutional specification of the collective decision processes involved at the domestic levels. Countries' representatives are able to choose among all technologically feasible domestic policies in the attempt of maximizing aggregate domestic welfare. Domestic politics and decisional procedures do not play any role and, in particular, do not impose any constraint on the set of feasible policies. 1 This paper studies the effect of the domestic institutions of ratification on the stability of international environmental agreements in an economy of the type studied by Chander and Tulkens (1997) , in which domestic production activities have, as a by-product, the emission of some transboundary pollutant.
We assume that in the absence of international cooperation, each domestic parliament independently determines by voting the level of domestic environmental regulation. We formally describe this pre-treaty (or no-treaty) state of the economy by means of the concept of International Non-cooperative Political Equilibrium (INPE). We prove existence and uniqueness of the INPE for our economy.
We then study international cooperation taking as a status quo the INPE of the economy.
The key element of our analysis is that an international agreement, defined as an emission abatement plan and some rule to share the associated costs among the involved countries, becomes effective in a country only if it is ratified by its parliament. In other words, the only feasible agreements are those which are ratified by all signatories. We show that for each configuration of coalitions in the system (i.e., for each "coalition structure"), there exists a unique collection of agreements -one for each coalition of cooperating countries -which are simultaneously ratified.
We then turn to the analysis of the incentives of national delegates to sign agreements at the international level. We assume that national delegates act on behalf of a supporting majority; moreover, delegates anticipate the outcome of the ratification vote, and only consider agreements that would be eventually ratified by their national parliaments. We look for coalitions structures that are stable to objections by subset of national delegates. The main game theoretic tool at this stage is a coalition formation game first introduced by Hart and Kurz (1983) . In this game delegates announce a coalition to which they wish to belong, anticipating that this coalition will implement the unique ratified agreement. We motivate the use of this game in section 5.1, where we also discuss the relationship between our analysis and that of the γ-core contained in Chander an Tulkens (1997).
We study the set of Strong Nash Equilibria of this game, each identifying a configuration of agreements -one for each set of cooperating countries -which are both domestically ratified and internationally stable. We find that the grand coalition is always a Strong Nash Equilibrium outcome, and the associated ratified international agreement shares abatement costs proportionally to the national incomes at the pre-treaty stage. Although other inefficient structures may emerge in equilibrium, we show that some degree of cooperation always occurs when domestic politicians maximize the aggregate welfare of their citizens. If politicians only maximize the welfare of their voters, the complete absence of cooperation may occur as a Strong Nash Equilibrium, but never as a Strict Strong Nash Equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the international economy. In Section 3 we formulate the voting game that describes the domestic decisional process, in the absence of international cooperation. In section 4 we prove existence and uniqueness of the international equilibrium resulting from these independent domestic policies. In Section 5 we study international cooperation: after an informal presentation of the decisional structure, which is of diplomatic nature at this stage, we present the game that bears upon the formation of coalitions among countries and prove our main result on politically stable international environmental agreements. Section 6 concludes the paper by summarizing its main points, comparing them with some of the alternative approaches mentioned above, and pointing towards generalization of our results for a larger class of preferences.
The International Economy
We consider an international economy E with a set K of countries, indexed by k = 1, ...,k , a single private good and ambient pollution, which is the outcome of the discharges emitted by the countries as a by-product of their private good production.
Components of E
The elements of the economy are as follows.
• Agents. The set of individual economic agents (citizens) is denoted by I = {1, ..., i, ..., n}.
The agents are partitioned intok countries. B k denotes the set of agents living in country k, with |B k | = n k .
• Commodities. There are three types of commodities in the economy: a private good x ≥ 0; pollutant discharges p k ≥ 0 occurring in country k, k ∈ K, with p = (p 1 , p 2 , ..., pk) denoting the vector of emissions occurring in all countries, and ambient pollution z ≤ 0.
• Ecological Transfer Function. Countries' discharges determine linearly and additively the amount of ambient pollution, according to the relation
We will sometimes use the notation z(p).
• Production Technology. Each country k produces a positive amount of the private good, denoted by the value of the production function 2 g k (p k ). We denote by g 0 k (p k ) and g 00 k (p k ) the first and second derivative of g k .
We assume the following:
• Preferences. Each agent i ∈ I has a utility function u i (z, x i ) defined on R − × R + , satisfying:
for all z ≥ 0, where v 0 and v 00 are the first and second derivatives of v..
By Assumption 4 any difference in the way agents value the environmental quality is only due to differences in the consumption level of the private good. In other words, we assume that there exists a fundamental valuation of the ambient quality which is common to all agents in the economy E, and is represented by the functional form v (z).
• Individual incomes. For each k ∈ K, agent i ∈ B k is allocated a share θ k i (with 0 ≤ θ k i ≤ 1 and
is the private income of agent i living in country k. We will denote by θ k the vector
For any feasible state (z, p, x), the pair (p, x) is called an allocation.
Definition 2 A Pareto optimum of the economy E is a feasible state (z, p, x) such that there exists no other feasible state
We now define an equilibrium concept for the economy E that will prove useful in the
Definition 3 A ratio equilibrium of the economy E is a triple (p, x, r) in which r = (r 1 , ..., r n ) is a cost sharing ratio, with r i = (r 1 i , ..., rk i ), such that for each k P i∈I r k i = 1 and such that for all i ∈ B k and all k ∈ K :
An equilibrium ratio r is a cost sharing vector with the property of inducing the same demand for emissions by all the agents in the economy. A property of the additive ecological transfer function is that at every ratio equilibrium (p, x, r) it must be that for all i r k i = r j i
for all k, j ∈ K.
The next Lemma, recording a uniqueness property of the set of Pareto optima of the economy E, is basically a restatement of Proposition 1 in Chander and Tulkens (1997). Since the economy E considered in the present paper differs from the one considered there in that the functional form of utility functions is not linearly separable in the private good, their uniqueness result needs be re-established for this case (see Appendix for the proof).
Lemma 1 Let (z, p, x) and (z 0 , p 0 , x 0 ) be two Pareto Optima of E. Then p = p 0 .
Proof. Appendix.
Sub-economies
In what follows, it will be useful to consider some variations on the economy E.
For all k ∈ K, we denote by E k (p −k ) the sub-economy obtained by restricting the economy E to the set of agents B k and a given vector of emissionsp −k = (p 1 , ...,p k−1 ,p k+1 , ...,pk) of countries other than k. A feasible state of the sub-economy
For any such feasible state, the pair (p k , x k ) is called an allocation for
The definition of a ratio equilibrium directly applies to the sub-economy E k (p −k ).
Some consistency relations between the sets of ratio equilibria of E and of the economies
..,k, will be established and used later on.
3 Domestic Decision Making
The Private Sector
If we assume that within each country k the private good is produced by the private sector, the level of emissions p 0 k may be thought of as the outcome of the absence of any environmental regulation, be it domestic or international, in country k. In this case, the amount g k 
The Public Sector
Countries are organized democratically. A legislative body decides by voting the level of domestic environmental regulation by fixing a maximal amount of emissions.
The Voting Game G k
We formally represent the voting procedure within country k by means of the voting game
in which B k is the set of players (members of parliament), p −k denotes the vector (p 1 , .., p k−1 , p k+1 , .., pk) of emissions outside country k and W d k ⊆ 2 B k is the set of winning coalitions, i.e., the coalitions that are decisive on domestic issues for the population of country k. In the case of simple majority rule, the set W d k contains all the coalitions that contain a majority of the population in k. The fact that the game is defined for a given vector p −k of external emissions reflects the assumption that the players' payoffs are defined on the states of the whole international economy E. For short we henceforth write
We make the following assumptions on voting rules:
We remark that the above two properties are the minimal requirement for our results.
They do not rule out the case in which winning coalitions count less than the majority of voters. The properness property 3 , although not needed for the formal derivation of our results, would rule out such undesirable cases.
A strategy for a winning coalition
k is a level of domestic emissions p k . Given p k , the distributive vector θ k imputes a well defined level of consumption to each agent in country
k have an empty strategy set. We assume that agents belonging to a winning coalition can operate any transfers of private good among them 4 , so that coalition
We say that coalition
can induce a state of the economy that all members prefer to (p k , x k ), with strict preference for at least one member.
Definition 4
The core of the voting game G k (p −k ) is the set of allocations (p k , x k ) that no coalition can improve upon.
Political Equilibrium in Country k
The core of any voting game G k (p −k ) has the property of being a stable collective decision in the parliamentary debate. We therefore define a political equilibrium in country k any state of the sub-economy E k (p −k ) induced by a core allocation in the game G k (p −k ).
belongs to the core of the associated voting game
The next Proposition fully characterizes the political equilibria of country k for any given vector of external emissions p −k .
Pareto optimal emission level and
Remark: In a political equilibrium no transfers of private good take place, and each agent consumes exactly the amount of private good determined by the efficient emission level of the restricted economy and by his distributive parameter.
International Non-Cooperative Political Equilibrium
Once we have determined the political equilibrium within each country as a function of the vector of external emissions, it is possible to characterize which states of the economy are expected to occur in the absence of international coordination of policies. Any such state must be such that all countries are simultaneously at a domestic political equilibrium.
The INPE may be considered as representing a no-treaty or pre-treaty equilibrium, in the sense that it describes the outcome of national policies in absence of coordination.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique INPE for the economy E.
By comparing the first order conditions characterizing the INPE and the Pareto Optimal state of the economy E we deduce that the INPE is generically not efficient. Indeed, these conditions write for any efficient state (z * , p * , x * ) as
and for the unique INPE as
Since under the present assumptions production levels are always positive in any efficient state, inefficiently high aggregate emission levels are associated with the INPE. This type of properties are explored in details in the next section.
5 International Cooperation
An Informal Discussion
The INPE can be considered as the predictable outcome in the economy E if countries do not communicate and coordinate their domestic policies. However, the inefficiency of the INPE provides countries with incentives to promote some sort of international cooperation. Such coordinated actions are carried out by means of international agreements, i.e., cooperative plans in which countries commit themselves to specific emission abatement plans as well as to cost-sharing schemes.
Definition 7 An International Agreement (I.A.) among the countries of the set K is a pair (∆p, α) consisting (i) of a vector of emission changes ∆p = (∆p 1 , ..., ∆pk) with respect to the INPE levels, with
for all k ∈ K, and (ii) of a total cost sharing
An I.A. thus prescribes changes in emissions with respect to those prevailing at the INPE, as well as a sharing rule among countries for the aggregate cost involved. In terms of forgone consumption of the private good, this cost is given by
while the induced ambient quality is:
Institutionally, for an I.A. to come into existence, it must be the result of some collective decision process that comprises at least two levels: (i) the signature (or diplomatic) level, consisting of the adoption of the agreement's content by (delegates of) the countries involved;
and (ii) the ratification (or political) level, consisting of the acceptance of that content within each of the countries involved.
In our analysis below, the ratification level is assumed to take place through voting on proposed agreements in each country. Domestic winning coalitions can object to a proposed IA by either rejecting it, in which case the economy remains at the no-treaty (INPE) state, or by proposing some alternative emissions vector.
As far as the signature level is concerned, we assume that each country is represented by a delegate, and we consider that for a proposed agreement to be adopted by the delegates it must be both ratified in all countries involved and "acceptable" in the following sense: for no coalition of delegates is it found preferable by its members to engage in a different agreement that they could also get ratified in their respective countries.
The two levels are intimately related through the fact that the ratification level sets limitations to the proposals that can be considered by the delegates, both as final outcome of cooperation and as conceivable deviations from it.
The mathematical models we use are a voting game for the political ratification level, and a coalition formation game formalizing the diplomatic signature level. The core allocations of the former, representing ratified agreements, determine the payoffs of the latter.
We show that the grand coalition is a Strong Nash Equilibrium of the coalition formation game, implying emission abatement plans ratified by all countries, and inducing a Pareto optimum of the (world) economy E. Moreover, although (inefficient) outcomes with several coexisting partial agreements are not ruled out in equilibrium, some degree of cooperation always emerges when political delegates maximize the aggregate welfare of their citizens..
Politics: The Ratification Voting Game
For any I.A. involving all countries, we denote by G k (B k , W r k , α k ) the domestic ratification voting game in country k bearing on an international agreement that imputes to that country the cost share α k . For a winning coalition S k ∈ W r k a strategy is any vector of abatements ∆p and possibly transfers among its members, with total imputed cost
Note that we are including as a feasible strategy for a domestic winning coalition S k the strategy ∆p 0 = 0 inducing the INPE state of the economy. If this strategy is adopted, the cooperation process is rejected at the ratification stage.
Individual payoffs yield the following expression for coalition S k 's worth:
Definition 8
We say that the I.A. (∆p * , α * ) is ratified by country k if for some vector of
A. is simply ratified if it is ratified by all countries.
The unique ratified I.A. is characterized in the next proposition. 
is the unique ratified international agreement. Moreover, within each country k the associated transfers scheme τ * k is such that τ k * i = 0 for all i ∈ B k .
Proposition 3 shows that the unique ratified international agreements prescribes the efficient emission levels and shares total costs proportionally to the relative income levels at the pre-treaty INPE.
The above definition and characterization can be applied to partial agreements within a subcoalition T of countries. Following the definition and letting α * T denote a cost sharing vector for countries in T , we say that the I.A. (∆p * T , α * T ) is ratified by the coalition of countries T ⊂ K given the emissions vector ∆p K\T if for all k ∈ T there exists some vector of transfers
such that the allocation induced by the vector
Proposition 3 easily extends as follows.
is the unique ratified partial agreement for the set of countries T given ∆p K\T . Moreover, in each country k ∈ T the associated transfers scheme τ * k is such that τ k * i = 0 for all i ∈ B k .
Diplomacy: The Coalition Formation Game
We now move to the international cooperation process itself. We wish to consider a model of cooperation in which national delegates only consider agreements which would eventually be ratified by their parliaments. As the previous section has shown, this restriction leaves national delegates with the sole choice of which coalition they wish to form, since once this choice is made, the ratified agreement is uniquely determined. This remark motivates us to model delegates' diplomatic behaviour by means of a coalition formation game, in which delegates consider different "partners" at the international stage, anticipating the effect of their choices on the payoff of the domestic winning coalition they represent.
The game we consider was first introduced by Hart and Kurz (1983) as the Γ coalition formation game. The set of players is K (all national delegates), with S * k ∈ W d k denoting the winning coalition represented by the k-th delegate (the coalition in power in country k).
Players act simultaneously. Each player k ∈ K announces a coalition T k ⊂ K to which he wishes to belong. A strategy for player k is denoted by σ k .
From Strategies to Coalition Structures
Once a profile of strategies σ = (T 1 , ..., Tk) is announced, players must be able to predict which coalitions will form in the system. Since the coalitions announced by thek players may not lead to a partition of the set K (or, in other words, players' wishes may not be compatible), a rule mapping strategy profiles into partitions of K is needed.
We will adopt the "gamma" rule, proposed by Hart and Kurz, predicting that coalition T effectively forms only if all of its members have announced precisely T . 5 Formally, the profile σ induces the cooperation structure
Under this rule, defections from a coalition induce the remaining players to split up as singletons 6 . In particular, any joint deviationσ T = (T, ..., T ) by a coalition of players T from, e.g., the strategy profile σ = (K, ..., K) induces a coalition structure
in which the unique smaller coalition T forms.
Payoffs
We now define an imputation rule, specifying the players' payoffs for each possible coalition structure. This, together with the coalition formation rule, will yield a well defined game.
Since we are only interested in ratified agreements, we associate with each coalition structure π = (T 1 , ..., T m ) a series of partial agreements, one for each element of π, with the property of being all simultaneously ratified. This leads to:
Definition 9 The vector of partial agreements ((∆p 1 ,α 1 ) , ..., (∆p m ,α m )) is a Partial Agreements Equilibrium (PAE) for the coalition structure π = (T 1 , ..., T m ) if (∆p h ,α h ) is a ratified partial agreement for T h given ∆p K\T h , for all h = 1, ..., m.
A PAE consists of a set partial agreements that are simultaneously ratified by all cooperating countries in the cooperation structure π. 5 This game has been studied under the name "Simultaneous Coalition Unanamity Game", see Yi (1997).
Hart and Kurz also consider the more permissive "delta" rule, allowing all players that have announced the same coalition to stay together. 6 In particular, defections from the grand coalition lead to the formation of a unique, smaller coalition. A similar and closely related assumption underlies the concept of γ core studied in Chander and Tulkens (1997).
We shall discuss the relation of the present paper with their work in our conclusion.
Lemma 3 For each coalition structure π there exists a unique PAE w.r.t. π.
The utility levels induced on the economy E by the PAE for the members of the cooperation structure π are used to define the payoffs in the game Γ. In particular, the payoff of delegate k when the profile of strategies σ is played is given by
where (∆p,α) is the PAE with respect to π (σ). The fact that in (2) the sum of private consumptions is taken over players in S * k formally represents the assumption that each delegate behaves on behalf of the domestic winning coalition he represents.
Strong Nash Equilibria of the Game
When seen as outcomes of a coalition formation game, equilibrium coalition structures identify stable agreements. In particular, Strong Nash Equilibria of the game Γ are strategy profiles with the property of being immune from both individual and coalitional deviations.
Definition 10 A Strong Nash Equilibrium of the coalition formation game Γ is a profile of strategies σ * such that there exists no coalition T ⊆ K with a vector of strategies σ T such
and for at least one
Equilibrium coalition structures identify politically stable agreements. We will now assert that the grand coalition always obtains as a Strong Nash Equilibrium outcome of the game
Γ.
Theorem. The strategy profile σ * = (K, ..., K) , in which all players choose the grand coalition, is a Strong Nash Equilibrium of the game Γ.
This directly implies that the unique I.A. ratified by all countries is also immune from deviations by means of national leaders. In this sense, this agreement can be legitimately expected to be proposed (and ratified) at national levels.
We prove the theorem in the appendix, under an additional assumption on total cost of cooperation, closely related to assumption 1", defined on preferences, used in Chander and Tulkens (1997). Formally,
Assumption 8 imposes a constraint on the way in which welfare improvements are attained through cooperation. It requires that if some sets of countries cooperate, then at least one of them does not obtain a higher level of private consumption than at the noncooperative equilibrium. In other words, the benefits of international cooperation must be, at least for one set of cooperating countries, not in terms of higher consumption levels but rather in terms of a higher environmental quality. This assumption is always satisfied if countries have the same production technology and\or constant returns to scale.
One final issue to be addressed is whether other coalition structures than the grand coalition may occur as equilibria of the game Γ -equilibria that would necessary be inefficient in view of the uniqueness property of the strategy adopted by any coalition of delegates. Let us consider in particular the most extreme case of inefficiency, namely the complete absence of cooperation, here represented by the coalition structureπ consisting of all countries as singletons: can it be an equilibrium outcome of the game Γ?
It is instructive to deal first with the case in which domestic delegates maximize the aggregate welfare of their citizens (in terms of the game Γ, the case in which S * k = B k for all k = 1, 2, ...,k). Let σ * = (K, K, ..., K) andσ be any strategy profile inducing the coalition structureπ. The uniqueness of the Pareto optimum of the economy E (proved in lemma 1), together with the characterization result of proposition 3, imply that:
Note also that since the international agreement (∆p * , α * ), induced by the profile σ * , satisfies the conditions for a ratio equilibrium of the economyĒ (obtained from E by considering the INPE as initial endowment), the induced allocation is individually rational for all agents in the economy, in the sense that it is weakly preferred to the INPE allocation. This leads to the following inequalities:
implying that
Conditions (3) and (4) imply that for some agent i * ∈ I
Since we are assuming that i * ∈ B k for some k, we conclude that for some k:
Conditions (5) and (7) directly imply the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Let S * k = B k for all k = 1, 2, ...,k. Then, the coalition structureπ in which no cooperation occurs is never a Strong Nash Equilibrium of the game Γ.
Thus, if political delegates maximize their countries' aggregate welfare, an international equilibrium must always contain some degree of cooperation. By contrast, if lack of cooperation prevails, it can only be imputed to the fact that political delegates do not represent the totality of their population but only a majority of it. To see how this may undermine the result of proposition 5, consider again condition (3). If S * k ⊂ B k for some k, we obtain
so that condition (3) can only be stated in the following form:
Again, we can use (8) to conclude that some i * exists for which condition (6) holds. However, it may now be the case that (6) only holds for one agent i * ∈ B k for some k ∈ K for which i * / ∈ S * k . If this is the case, no incumbent winning coalition strictly prefers the efficient outcome (z * , x * ) to the INPE allocation, and the proof of proposition 5 does not extend.
Notice that when complete non cooperation arises in equilibrium, it is because all members of incumbent winning coalitions are as well off as at the efficient outcome (z * , x * ), while the "minority" agents are prevented from exploiting the surplus of cooperation. In this sense it can be argued that inefficiency is here strictly due to the political nature of delegates strategies.
These arguments show that no cooperation may be a stable outcome, in the particular sense of Strong Nash Equilibria. However, condition ( (4)) also implies that the set K of delegates must either prefer full cooperation to the complete absence of cooperation, or be indifferent between these two outcomes. If we define the notion of Strict Strong Nash Equilibrium by relaxing the requirement of strict improvement of at least one player in definition 10 above 7 , the following directly follows:
The coalition structureπ in which no cooperation occurs is never a Strict Strong Nash Equilibrium of the game Γ.
Conclusions
In this paper we have looked at international agreements that satisfy two stability requirements: they are a stable solution of the international negotiation process and they are domestically stable in the sense that they are ratified by all parliaments. We identify a unique I.A. among the whole set of countries, with the following properties:
1. It prescribes the efficient emissions levels for the international economy (lemma 2); 2. It shares abatement costs among countries proportionally to the relative incomes at the INPE (proposition 2); 3. Domestically, no transfers occur, and each agent consumes the amount of private good determined by his distributive parameter and by his country's cost share (proposition 2). 7 We are here extending the notion of Strict Nash Equilibrium to coalitional deviations, considered in the Strong Nash Equilibirum concept. Intuitively, the strictness refinement requires that players can only do worse by changing their strategies from the equilibrium.
Our main theorem establishes that if this agreement is chosen, then the grand coalition is a stable outcome of a suitably defined coalition formation game. Moreover, although (inefficient) cooperation structure with several coexisting coalitions are not ruled out in equilibrium, some degree of cooperation always emerges when political delegates represent the totality of their population.
The specific cost sharing rule implied by the stable I.A. in the present paper should be related with the core-stable allocation identified by Chander and Tulkens (1997) for a similar economy with quasilinear preferences. In both papers, the way in which costs are imputed in equilibrium satisfy the property of the "ratio equilibrium", introduced for an economy with public goods by Kaneko (1977) . More precisely, both papers propose the ratio equilibrium of the economyĒ, obtained from the economy E by considering the INPE as initial endowment. The induced allocation has the nice feature of being computable, requiring, in the present paper, the only information of aggregate income levels at the no-treaty state of the economy. While in Chander and Tulkens (1997) this allocation is shown only to belong to the core of the international economy (among possibly other ones), in the present paper it is shown to characterize the unique stable agreement among the whole set of countries.
This difference is due to the introduction of voting as domestic decision process, replacing the traditional aggregate utility maximization within each coalition. Since objections are "easier" for winning coalitions than for unanimous coalitions, all allocations other than the ratio equilibrium are objected to in the present paper, while some of them may still be stable in Chander and Tulkens (1997) . In contrast, while no efficient outcome was stable in the core-theoretic analysis, here inefficiency may emerge for the impossibility of operating the transfers of private good that are needed to attain a Pareto improvement.
A final word must be spent on the robustness of our result to larger classes of preferences.
The special class adopted in this paper simplifies the analysis in three respects. Firstly, it is responsible for the uniqueness of the various solution concepts adopted in the paper.
Second, equilibrium ratios of the sub-economies coincide with the distributional vectors θ, making the present environment equivalent to one of linear income taxation and allowing for a nonempty set of political equilibria. Third, the transferable utility property of preferences allowed us to determine the payoffs of national delegates as the aggregate utility of the supporting winning coalition. Our main results would still carry over to a more general class of preferences, requiring monotonicity of preferences in the private good, normality of the public good "ambient quality". Our characterization of the stable agreement, on the contrary, is strictly related to the specific form of preferences we have adopted. Although politically stable I.A. would still satisfy the ratio equilibrium property, cost shares would not be directly related to national incomes at the INPE.
APPENDIX Proof of Lemma 1
Let v 0 (z) denote the derivative of v with respect to p k evaluated at z, for all k = 1, ...,k.
By the
Suppose now that p 6 = p 0 and, w.l.g., p k > p 0 k . Note that Pareto optimality requires that
this would imply that p j ≥ p 0 j for all j ∈ K, and thus z 0 > z. It follows from strict monotonicity of g j for all j ∈ K that
and by concavity of v w.r.t. z that
which, using the definition of z, implies
Taking into account the fact that (9), (10) and (12) contradict the requirement that g 0
Proof of Lemma 2
A ratio equilibrium is a triple (p k , x k , r k ) such that every agent i ∈ B k demands the same vector p k facing the ditributive vector r i . Agen i ∈ B k demanding the emision p k and facing the ratio r i consumes the amount
By the first order conditions we get
from which
By imposing the condition
from which, using the fact that
yielding, together with (15),
The fact that p * is the efficient vector of the economy E k (p −k ) comes from the fact that ratio equilibria trivially satisfy the Samuelson's conditions for that subeconomy.
Proof of Proposition 1.
We know by lemma 2 that the distributive parameter θ k is the unique vector of equilibrium ratios of the sub-economy E k (p −k ). We also know by theorems 1 and 2 in Hirokawa (1992) that the core of the voting game G k (p −k ) coincides with the set of ratio equilibrium allocations of the sub-economy E k (p −k ). It follows that the unique political equilibrium is the state of the economy associated with the ratio equilibrium allocation of E k (p −k ).
Proof of Proposition 2
Existence: We denote by f j (p −j ) the Pareto efficient level of emissions in country j given the levels p −j . Let also f(p) be the kth product of the functions f j (p −j ) for j = 1, ...,k.
A fixed point p * of the map f (p) is a point p * such that p * ∈ f (p * ). By definition 6 and proposition 1, if p * is a fixed point of f then the pair
is an INPE. By
Kakutani fixed point theorem, f admits a fixed point if it is upper hemi continuous, covex valued and defined on a nonempty, compact and convex set. As the product maintains these properties, it is enough to check these conditions on each projection map f j (p −j ). Since the domain of f j is the closed, convex and non-empty set
and since f is a function by lemma 1, we just need to show upper hemi continuity of f, i.e., of the efficient value p j of the economy E j (p −j ) as a function of p −j . This directly follows from continuity of v and g k .
Uniqueness: Assume that there exist two INPE (p, x) 6 = (p 0 , x 0 ). Let z and z 0 be the induced amounts of ambient pollution. By the characterization of INPE, for all k ∈ K:
By the assumptions that g 0 k ≥ 0, g 00 k ≤ 0, v 0 ≥ 0 and v 00 ≤ 0 the following implications hold:
Then, for some j 6 = k it must be that p 0 j ≤ p j , implying, by the same series of implications, that z 0 ≤ z. The two inequalities together yield that z 0 = z. Then, in any INPE the aggregate ambient pollution is the same. Suppose now that p 0 k > p k for some k. Then, by concavity,
These two facts, together with the fact that z 0 = z and the two first order conditions in (18), imply a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3.
LetĒ be the economy derived by E considering the INPE as initial endowment. In terms of Ito and Kaneko (1981) ,Ē is defined by considering the level of emissions at the INPE as allowance level, and individual incomes at the levels defined by the INPE production and by the distributinve vector θ. Agen i demanding the vector p and facing the ratio r i consumes the amount
A ratio equilibrium for this economy is a triple (p, x, r) such that every agent i demands vector p facing the ditributive vector r i . We first show that the triple (p * , x * , r * ), where p * is the efficient vector of the economy E,
and for i ∈ B k
is the unique ratio equilibrium ofĒ. Agent i faces the following problem
Since Pareto Optimality implies that
it follows that in equilibrium r k i = r m i = r i , ∀j, m ∈ K, ∀i ∈ I. By imposing the condition P i∈I r i = 1, we get
It can be easily checked by means of the relevant first order conditions that the vector p * is indeed the efficient emission vector of the economy E.
We can again apply the results of lemmas 5 and 6 to conclude that α * is the only vector inducing the same vector of emissions changes as a ratio equilibrium of every sub economȳ E (α * k ). The result then follows from theorems 1 and 2 in Hirokawa (1992).
Proof of Lemma ??
Existence of the PAE can then be proved by direct application of the formal argument used in the proof of existence of a INPE. In this respect, note that in the case of the PAE, each group of countries belonging to the same element of π jointly choose their vector of emissions, while in the case of the INPE each country is choosing a single level of emission.
Since by Lemma 4 every element of π is choosing the unique efficient level of emissions in any PAE, the existence proof for the INPE, relying on Kakutani's fixed point theorem, can be applied, provided upper hemi continuity is preserved. In this respect, the same argument used in the proof of proposition 2 extends. Similarly, the argument for uniqueness used in proposition 2 carries over to this case.
We will first prove three preparatpry lemmas.
The first extends to the present setting the characterization results of Proposition 1 in 
Suppose now thatz >z; then by strict concavity of v in z we have
which, using the definition of z yields
Since the term
is decreasing in p j by concavity of g j , we get thatz >z ⇒p j ≤p j for every j ∈ K\T .
Consider now the partition π (T ). By point a) it follows that for all k ∈ T m and all
Ifz > z then, by similar arguments to the one used above we get
Rewriting the term
and using the fact that
we obtain the following inequality
which implies thatp k ≥p k for all k ∈ T m . The two results together imply thatz ≤z, which contradicts the assumption. Then it must be thatz ≥z.
c) Suppose thatp j <p j for some country j ∈ K\T . Concavity of g j implies
or, by points a) and b),
Again using the definition of z and the fact that, by point b),z ≤z, we conclude that (20) implies
which, by the fact that g j is monotonically increasing, implies a contradiction. This fact, together with point b), imply that aggregate emissions of countries in T are smaller at the PAE than at the INPE.
The next two lemmas establish consistency properties of the set of ratio equilibria. For a given real number α k ∈ (0, 1], let E k (α k ) denote the economy with set of agents B k and all other fundamentals as in E, and in which the cost function is given by α k C j (p j ) for all j = 1, 2, ...,k.
Lemma 5 (van den Nouweland, Tijs and Wooders). If (p * , x * , r * ) is a ratio equilibrium of the economy E and α * k = P i∈B k r * i , then (p * , x * k ,
) is a ratio equilibrium of E k (α * k ).
Lemma 6 Let α * 1 , ..., α * k be such that P k α * k = 1. If there exists p * and τ * such that (p * , x * k , τ * k ) is a ratio equilibrium of E k (α * k ) for all k, then there is a ratio equilibrium (p * , x * , r * ) of the economy E such that Since (p * , x * k , τ * k ) is a ratio equilibrium of E k (α * k ) for all k, we can write that for all i ∈ B k , for all k ∈ K and for all p :
C(p j )). follow directly from the definition of (τ * α * ). In particular, for the economy E we have that α * k = P i∈B k θ k i for all k is the unique vector compatible with a ratio equilibrium in each sub economy E k (α * k ).
Proof of the Theorem.
We are now ready to prove the theorem. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that some coalition of players T improves upon the strategy profile σ * by means of the alternative profile σ T . Denote by (∆p * , α * ) the ratified I.A., and by (∆p,α) the PAE w.r.t. coalition structureπ = ³ π (T ) , {j} j∈K\T´i nduced by the deviation of T and whose elements are the partition π (T ) of the set T and all the players outside T as singletons. We will use the notiation z * andz to indicate the induced environmental qualities. Using the definition of payoffs, the fact that T improves upon σ * implies that ∀i ∈ S * k and ∀k ∈ T :
By Lemma 4 we know that ∆p k ≥ 0 for all k ∈ K\T . Denoting by 0 K\T the vector of zero changes in emissions of countries in K\T , this, together with monotonicity of v, implies
Inequalities (21) and (22) imply that
We show that (23) 
Suppose not, so that for some i ∈ S * k and some k ∈ T :
By the equilibrium properties of the cost share vector α * k , we obtain (see lemmas 5 and 6 and proposition 3):
Using (25) and (26) we obtain a contradiction of (23).
We then use the definitions of x i (∆p,α) and of x i ³ ∆p T , 0 K\T , α * ´a nd sum up (24) over i ∈ S * k and ∀k ∈ T m for some T m ∈ π (T ) to obtain:
or, more simply,
Using now assumption 8 and the definitions of α * k andα k we obtain
Note that in the above summation, all terms in brakets are weakly negative, since P j∈K g j (p j ) ≥ P j∈T m g j (p j ). This implies a contradiction and concludes the proof.
